Non-state education providers enroll at least 20% of all primary-school pupils in low-income countries and over 60% of all school-aged children in Nairobi’s informal settlements. Despite extensive research on the programmatic effects of these schools, including on outcomes such as enrollment and test scores, there is little empirical evidence on the political effects of increased non-state education provision. I develop a theoretical argument for how non-state education providers affect the social norms that incentivize or undermine political behaviors critical to accountable government education. I test my theory with original observational, experimental, and qualitative data from Nairobi, Kenya. I find that individuals who live in neighborhoods with more private schools are less likely (by about 55-60%) to view the government as a credible provider of education, less likely (by about 50-70%) to believe that their neighbors would monitor or support government schools, and less likely (by about 50%) to monitor government schools themselves. Results persist even after accounting for the likelihood that individual school-choice is endogenous to political behavior and beliefs regarding government education. My survey experiment yields null results; however, the findings along with my qualitative data provide important insights on the conditions necessary for information signals to reshape social institutions. Ultimately, my results provide some of the first empirical evidence on how non-state education provision affects the social institutions that contribute to effective governance of public education systems in low-income countries.
Working paper available upon request.
